Endnotes from the book
For reasons explained in the NOTES section of our book, I have repeated the endnotes here, with clickable links for those references that are accessible online. All references are included to make it easy to find one from the book. Some of the links require that you subscribe to the associated publication or that you access through a library which has a subscription.
If you find any links that have become stale, please use the CONTACT form to let me know that and, if possible, provide a new link so I can update it. Otherwise I’ll try to find a fresh link, or change accessible online to read not accessible online so people know that it has disappeared. Thanks!
1. Dimitri K. Simes, “The Realist: Reawakening an Empire,” The National Interest, July/August 2014, pp. 5-15. The quoted text appears on the top of page 6. Accessible online.
2. The New York Times Editorial Board, “Vladimir Putin Can Stop This War,” New York Times, July 18, 2014, page A22. Accessible online.
3. Carl Jung, Man and His Symbols, Doubleday, Garden City, NY, 1964, page 85.
4. That the Johnson Administration depicted the attack on the Maddox as “unprovoked” can be seen in the following excerpt from US State Department, Protest to Hanoi, August 3, 1964; “The United States Government takes an extremely serious view of the unprovoked attack made by Communist North Vietnamese torpedo boats on an American naval vessel, the USS Maddox, operating on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin on August 2.” Accessible online. An audio clip of the key part of Johnson’s now declassified conversation of August 3, 1964, can be heard on Marty’s blog post, “Avoiding Needless Wars, Part 1: The First Gulf of Tonkin Incident,” which is accessible online.
5. Leo Tolstoy, A Confession, The Gospels in Brief, and What I Believe, translated by Aylmer Maude, Oxford University Press, 1971, pp 316-317. Here’s the key excerpt:
The passage which served me as key to the whole was Matthew, v. 38, 39: “Ye have heard that it was said, An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth: But I say unto you, Resist not him that is evil” … These words suddenly appeared to me as something quite new, as if I had never read them before. Previously when reading that passage I had always, by some strange blindness, omitted the words, “But I say unto you, Resist not him that is evil,” just as if those words had not been there, or as if they had no definite meaning. Subsequently, in my talks with many and many Christians familiar with the Gospels, I often had occasion to note the same blindness as to those words. No one remembered them, and often when speaking about that passage Christians referred to the Gospels to verify the fact that the words were really there.
6. Charles Lane, “The Professor Who Lit the Spark,” Stanford (Stanford University’s Alumni magazine), Accessible online.
7. Jay Thorwaldson, “Emelia Rathbun, founder of Global Community, dies,” Palo Alto Weekly, October 13, 2004. Accessible online.
8. The Robert Wilson quote starts at 33:27 on the DVD version of The Day After Trinity.
9. Anriban Nag and James McGeever, “Foreign exchange, the world’s biggest market, is shrinking,” Reuters, February 11, 2016. Accessible online.
10. Strobe Talbott, “Russia Has Nothing to Fear,” New York Times, February 18, 1997, page A25. Accessible online.
11. Mark Landler and Helene Cooper, “U.S. Fortifying Europe’s East to Deter Putin,” New York Times, February 2, 2016, page A6. Accessible online.
12. Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand: Memoirs of a Presidential Diplomat, Random House Paperback, New York, 2003, page 74.
13. Marty asked several people to review this section for accuracy because human memory, his included, is subject to error, and because he had strong emotions connected to the patent fight with RSA and his battle with NSA. Jim Bidzos pointed out several errors that now have been corrected. Adm. Inman found the description of his conversations with Marty to be accurate. Lew Morris died in 2005, so Dr. Jim Omura who cofounded Cylink with Lew reviewed this from Cylink’s perspective and found no errors.
14. Henry Corrigan-Gibbs, “Keeping Secrets,” Stanford, November/December 2014, pp. 58-64. Accessible online.
15. Martin Hellman, “Defusing the Nuclear Threat: A Necessary First Step,” accessible online.
16. “Syria: Hillary Clinton calls Russia and China ‘despicable’ for opposing UN resolution,” The Telegraph, February 25, 2012. Accessible online.
17. “Medvedev: Libya has influenced our position on Syria,” RT, July 30, 2012. Accessible online.
18. George Ball, “COMMENTARY; AND NOW, THE REAGANEV DOCTRINE,” Boston Globe, October 30, 1983. Accessible online by searching the Boston Globe’s archives.
19. Joshua Goldstein, “Syria War Reverses Trend in Battle Deaths,” International Relations blog, July 4, 2013. Accessible online.
20. Anatoly A. Gromyko and Martin E. Hellman editors, Breakthrough: Emerging New Thinking, Walker and Co., New York, 1988, page 211. Accessible online.
21. Marina Krakovsky, “The Effort Effect,” Stanford, March/April 2007. Accessible online.
22. Carol S. Dweck, Self Theories: Their Role in Motivation, Personality and Development, Psychology Press (Taylor & Francis Group), Philadelphia, PA, 2000, pp. 24-26.
23. Carol S. Dweck, 2011 Award for Distinguished Scientific Contributions, “Mindsets and Human Nature: Promoting Change in the Middle East, the Schoolyard, the Racial Divide, and Willpower,” American Psychologist, November 2012, pp. 614-622. Accessible online. See also Eran Halperin, Alexandra G. Russell, Kali H. Trzesniewski, James J. Gross, Carol S. Dweck, “Promoting the Middle East Peace Process by Changing Beliefs About Group Malleability,” Science, vol. 333, September 2011, pp. 1767-1769. Accessible online.
24. Plato, The Republic, Book VII. Accessible online.
25. Bill Kays confirmed Marty’s recollection of this event and gave permission to be quoted.
26. Marty’s “Stanford Engineering Hero” lecture is accessible online.
27. James Frieden, “Alice Paul and the Struggle for the 19th Amendment: What Really Happened.” Accessible online. The key excerpt is: “[In 1912, just seven years before the 19th amendment was adopted,] NAWSA leaders believed that passage of a national suffrage amendment was impossible.” NAWSA stands for the National American Woman Suffrage Association, founded in 1890.
28. “WIN/Gallup International’s annual global End of Year survey shows a brighter outlook for 2014.” Accessible online.
29. The audio introduction of The Shadow is accessible online.
30. Seumas Milne, “The demonisation of Russia risks paving the way for war,” The Guardian, March 4, 2015. Accessible online.
31. Bob Woodward, Bush at War, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2002, pp. 339-340.
32. Carl Jung, Man and His Symbols, Doubleday, Garden City, NY, 1964, page 85.
33. “Transcript: Sir David Frost interviews Tony Blair,” December 11, 2006. Accessible online.
34. “H.R.4655 Iraq Liberation Act of 1998.” Accessible online.
35. A copy of the aide’s handwritten notes is accessible online. He uses abbreviations, with “Hit SH @ same time – not only UBL,” meaning “Hit Saddam Hussein at the same time – not only Usama Bin Laden.” He says “Go massive. Sweep it all up, things related and not,” near the bottom of that page. For more information, see Julian Borger, “Blogger bares Rumsfeld’s post 9/11 orders,” The Guardian, February 24, 2006. Accessible online.
36. Linda Feldmann, “The impact of Bush linking 9/11 and Iraq,” Christian Science Monitor, March 14, 2003. Accessible online.
37. The Washington Post, “President Bush Holds a News Conference (Transcript),” August 21, 2006. Accessible online.
38. Colonel Wilkerson’s quote starts at 1:25:30 on the DVD version of Taxi to the Dark Side.
39. David Brancaccio interview with Lawrence Wilkerson, February 3, 2006, for PBS’s NOW program. The transcript is accessible online.
40. Phil Donahue’s quote starts at 52:23 on the DVD of Buying the War.
41. Pew Research Center, Religion & Public Life, “The World’s Muslims: Unity and Diversity; Chapter 1: Religious Affiliation,” lists Iraq’s population as being 42% Sunni and 51% Shia. Accessible online.
42. Mark MacKinnon, “Globe in Iraq: Desperate exodus in search of safe ground,” The Globe and Mail, June 26, 2014. Accessible online.
43. George Washington University’s National Security Archive, “Vietnam, Episode 11, Interview with Robert McNamara.” Accessible online.
44. An August 3, 1964 “Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam,” which was then forwarded to the North Vietnamese refers to “the unprovoked attack” on the Maddox and to “the grave consequences which would inevitably result from any further unprovoked offensive military action against United States forces.” Accessible online.
45. Michael R. Beschloss, Taking Charge: The Johnson White House Tapes, 1963-64, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1997, pp. 493-494, has the Johnson quote with some minor, inconsequential variations in the transcription (e.g., what I heard as “fire,” he transcribed as “fired”). An audio clip of the key part of Johnson’s conversation of August 3, 1964, can be heard on my blog post, “Avoiding Needless Wars, Part 1: The First Gulf of Tonkin Incident,” which is accessible online.
46. Robert J. Hanyok, “Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish: The Gulf of Tonkin Mystery, 2-4 August 1964,” Cryptologic Quarterly, Winter 2000/Spring 2001 Edition, Vol. 19, No. 4 / Vol. 20, No. 1. Accessible online. The relevant excerpt is on page 3 (emphasis added):
Two startling findings emerged from the new research. First, it is not simply that there is a different story as to what happened; it is that no attack happened that night. Through a compound of analytic errors and an unwillingness to consider contrary evidence, American SIGINT elements in the region and at NSA HQs reported Hanoi’s plans to attack the two ships of the Desoto patrol. Further analytic errors and an obscuring of other information led to publication of more “evidence.” In truth, Hanoi’s navy was engaged in nothing that night but the salvage of two of the boats damaged on 2 August
47. “Sea Action: ‘This Is No Drill’,” Newsweek, August 17, 1964, pp. 19-20.
48. Captain Herrick’s cautionary cable is on page 49 of NSA’s, “The Gulf of Tonkin Incident: The DESOTO Patrols and OPLAN 34A,” which is accessible online. It also can be found in The Pentagon Papers, available in hard copy from major booksellers and accessible online by searching.
49. Robert J. Hanyok, “Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish: The Gulf of Tonkin Mystery, 2-4 August 1964.” Accessible online.The relevant excerpt is on page 3:
Beginning with the period of the crisis in early August, into the days of the immediate aftermath, and continuing into October 1964, SIGINT information was presented in such a manner as to preclude responsible decisionmakers in the Johnson administration from having the complete and objective narrative of events of 4 August 1964. Instead, only SIGINT that supported the claim that the communists had attacked the two destroyers was given to administration officials.
50. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State, June 5, 1964, marked “Literally eyes only for Rusk and McNamara from Lodge.” Accessible online.
51. Barry Goldwater’s 1960 book, The Conscience of a Conservative, states at Kindle locations 964-967: “it is clear that we cannot hope to match the Communist world man for man, nor are we capable of furnishing the guns and tanks necessary to defend thirty nations scattered over the face of the globe. The long-overdue answer, as we will see later on, lies in the development of a nuclear capacity for limited wars.”
See also Nina Tannenwald, “Nuclear Weapons and the Vietnam War,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 29, No. 4, August 2006, pp. 675-722, which states: “Senator Barry Goldwater, campaigning for the Republican presidential nomination in May 1964, suggested in a speech that tactical nuclear weapons should be treated more like conventional weapons, and that they should be used in Vietnam.” Accessible online.
52. “Dirksen and Halleck Say G.O.P. Must Make Vietnam an Issue,” New York Times, July 3, 1964, page 7. Accessible online.
53. Charles Mohr, “Senator Arrives on Coast,” New York Times, July 10, 1964, page 1. Accessible online.
54. The transcript of President Johnson’s August 4, 1964 television address is accessible online.
55. “Vietnam: A Television History; Interview with McGeorge Bundy.” Accessible online. In it Bundy says, “there were two episodes toward the end of 1964 where I think he [President Johnson] decided not to uh, take action for essentially uh, uh special reasons. One of them was an attack uh, that occurred just before the election, and an action taken right on the eve of election might have magnified [the] effect one way or another that made it an inappropriate moment for serious choice. … The [October 31] Bien Hoa attack brought strong recommendations from the field that there should be a uh, some kind of reply. That attack occurred uh, just [three days] before the election [on November 3], and although I don’t recall hearing the president explain his decision not to act in terms of the election, I feel quite confident that uh, he uh, would have thought that taking an action uh, as large as this and in terms of its public impact on the eve of the election would be a mistake.”
56. George McT. Kahin and John W. Lewis, “The United States in Vietnam,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume XXI, Number 6, June 1965, pp 28-40, states: “there was one crucially important, though temporary and in a sense artificial, advantage which the U.S. enjoyed. This derived from the unequivocal provision in the Geneva Accords that elections would be held in July 1956, under international supervision, to unify the country under one government. In anticipation of these elections (and also because of its preoccupation with the economic rehabilitation of the North), the Vietminh initially honored a central provision of the Accords and abstained from militant tactics in the South. … It was obviously a much surprised Vietminh that came to realize during 1955–56 that … elections were not going to be held. When on July 16, 1955, the Diem government announced, with American backing, that it would defy the provision calling for national elections, it violated a central condition which had made the Geneva Accords acceptable to the Vietminh.”
57. Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Worldwide deployments of nuclear weapons, 2014,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 1, 2014. See Table 1. Accessible online.
58. Karen Robes Meeks, “Listen to Hillary Clinton compare Russian President Vladimir Putin to Hitler,” Los Angeles Daily News, March 5, 2014. Accessible online.
59. Rick Atkinson, “The Road to D-Day: Behind the Battle That Won the War,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2013. Accessible online.
60. Col. David M. Glantz (US Army, Retired), “The Soviet-German War 1941-1945: Myths and Realities: A Survey Essay,” presented at the 20th Anniversary Distinguished Lecture at the Strom Thurmond Institute of Government and Public Affairs, Clemson University, October 11, 2001. The table on page 14 shows that 80% of the German permanent losses were on the Eastern Front. Accessible online.
61. US Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Milestones: 1937-1945. U.S.-Soviet Alliance, 1941-1945.” Accessible online.
62. Vladimir Putin, “Life Is Such a Simple, Yet Cruel Thing,” Russia Insider, May 9, 2015. This English translation is accessible online. The original Russian language article is also accessible online.
63. Turner Catledge, “Our Policy Stated,” New York Times, June 24, 1941, page 1 (continued on page 7).
64. Facsimiles of the 38 pages of Operation Unthinkable are accessible online.
65. Paul Boyer, When Time Shall Be No More: Prophecy Belief in Modern American Culture, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1992, page 142: “The Late Great Planet Earth strengthened Reagan’s prophecy belief, and at a 1971 political dinner in Sacramento shortly after a leftist coup in Libya (a nation mentioned in Ezekiel as one of Israel’s invaders), Reagan observed somberly: ‘That’s a sign that the day of Armageddon isn’t far off … Everything is falling into place. It can’t be long now. Ezekiel says that fire and brimstone will be rained upon the enemies of God’s people. That must mean they’ll be destroyed by nuclear weapons.’”
66. President Reagan seemed to be both attracted to and repelled by nuclear weapons, and came close to agreeing to abolish them at the 1986 Reykjavik summit with Gorbachev. Even so, his belief in the Biblical prophesies may have produced a dangerous, unconscious attraction to nuclear war as bringing about the Second Coming of Christ.
67. Fyodor Lukyanov, “What Russia Learned From the Iraq War,” AL Monitor, March 18, 2013, Accessible online.
68. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Ukraine’s Tymoshenko Finally Appears, But Next Move Unclear,” February 11, 2010. Accessible online.
69. Martin Hellman, “Ukraine: Why We Need to Stop and Think,” March 6, 2014. Accessible online.
70. Steve Stecklow and Oleksandor Akymenko, “Special Report: Flaws found in Ukraine’s probe of Maidan massacre,” Reuters dispatch, October 10, 2014. Accessible online.
71. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Kyiv Violence Steps Up Pressure To Reject Ultranationalists,” September 1, 2015. Accessible online.
72. Ulrich Weisser, “No Digs at Moscow: The West has to stick to its promises,” The Atlantic Times, March 2007 issue.
73. Benjamin Bidder, “Zhirinovsky’s Follies: Nuclear Threats and Busty Ladies in the Race for Second-Place in Russia,” Spiegel Online International, February 28, 2008. Accessible online.
74. Siegfried Hecker “Denuclearizing North Korea,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May-June 2008, pp. 44-49, 61-62. Dr. Hecker states: “From 1994 to December 2002, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors monitored the freeze of production facilities, while Yongbyon technical specialists were allowed to conduct periodic maintenance of the facilities. After the United States accused North Korea of operating a clandestine uranium enrichment program in October 2002, Pyongyang expelled the IAEA inspectors, withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and restarted its nuclear facilities.” Accessible online.
75. The Federation of American Scientists, “Guide to Nuclear Facilities, DPRK Yongbyon web page,” which is accessible online, says that the 50-MW(e) “reactor was expected to be completed in 1995.” This reactor would have been 10 times larger than the 5 MW(e) reactor that has produced all of their plutonium and made enough for approximately one bomb per year.
The Federation of American Scientists, “Guide to Nuclear Facilities, DPRK Taechon web page,” which is accessible online, says: “North Korea’s 200-MW(e) reactor was expected to be completed in 1996.” This reactor would have been 40 times larger than the 5 MW(e) research reactor.
In a private communication, Dr. Siegfried Hecker, former Director of Los Alamos, estimated that, before construction was stopped in 1994, the 50 MW(e) reactor was two to three years away from completion, and the 200 MW(e) reactor would have taken six years to complete. The wording I used in the text took into account the slight differences between Dr. Hecker’s and the FAS’s estimates of completion times.
76. Siegfried S. Hecker, “Lessons learned from the North Korean nuclear crisis,” Daedelus, Winter 2010, pp. 1-13, says: “With the capabilities it already had or was soon to complete by the early 1990s, Pyongyang today could have an arsenal of a hundred or more nuclear weapons. Instead [because of the negotiated 1994 Agreed Framework], it has enough plutonium for four to eight weapons and currently is not producing more.” A prepublication version is accessible online.
77. Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Worldwide deployments of nuclear weapons, 2014,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2-14. Accessible online. Table 1 lists North Korea’s arsenal as of that date as being “<10.”
78. Siegfried S. Hecker, “Return Trip to North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Complex,” November 20, 2010, states: “The 50 MWe reactor, which was near completion in the mid-1990s but abandoned during the Agreed Framework was being dismantled with large cranes.” Accessible online.
79. James Dao, “Bush Administration Halts Payments to Send Oil to North Korea,” New York Times, November 14, 2002, states: “The Bush administration said today that it would stop financing monthly shipments of fuel oil to North Korea, which are required under a 1994 arms control agreement, to punish North Korea for pursuing a covert nuclear weapons program.” Accessible online.
80. Glenn Kessler, “South Korea Offers To Supply Energy if North Gives Up Arms,” The Washington Post, July 13, 2005. Accessible online.
81. “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” September 2002, says: “To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.” Accessible online.
82. The full text of the 1994 “Agreed Framework Between The United States of America And The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” is accessible online.
83. Siegfried S. Hecker, “Lessons learned from the North Korean nuclear crisis,” Daedelus, Winter 2010, pp. 1-13. A prepublication version is accessible online.
84. President Bush’s December 19, 2003 speech welcoming Libya back into the family of nations said in part: “Today in Tripoli, the leader of Libya, Colonel Moammar al-Ghadafi, publicly confirmed his commitment to disclose and dismantle all weapons of mass destruction programs in his country. … And another message should be equally clear: leaders who abandon the pursuit of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, and the means to deliver them, will find an open path to better relations with the United States and other free nations. … As the Libyan government takes these essential steps and demonstrates its seriousness, its good faith will be returned. Libya can regain a secure and respected place among the nations, and over time, achieve far better relations with the United States. … old hostilities do not need to go on forever. And I hope that other leaders will find an example in Libya’s announcement today.” The full speech is accessible online.
85. Korean Central News Agency, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman Denounces U.S. Military Attack on Libya,” March 22, 2011. Initially this was online, but has disappeared. The relevant excerpt reads:
The present Libyan crisis teaches the international community a serious lesson.
It was fully exposed before the world that “Libya’s nuclear dismantlement” much touted by the U.S. in the past turned out to be a mode of aggression whereby the latter coaxed the former with such sweet words as “guarantee of security” and “improvement of relations” to disarm itself and then swallowed it up by force.
It proved once again the truth of history that peace can be preserved only when one builds up one’s own strength as long as high-handed and arbitrary practices go on in the world.
The DPRK was quite just when it took the path of Songun [“Military First”] and the military capacity for self-defence built up in this course serves as a very valuable deterrent for averting a war and defending peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.
86. Choe Sang-Hun, “South Korea Disputes North’s Dismissal of Armistice,” New York Times, March 13, 2013, page A6, mentions North Korea canceling the armistice, threatening the U.S. with nuclear attack, and evacuating citizens to tunnels. Accessible online.
BBC News, “North Korea cuts military hotline with South,” March 27, 2013, mentions North Korea cutting the hotline to South Korea and warning that “war may break out at any moment.” Accessible online.
87. The full report, “Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence,” 1995, is accessible online. The quoted text is on the next to last page, in a bullet point that reads: “Because of the value that comes from the ambiguity of what the US may do to an adversary if the acts we seek to deter are carried out, it hurts to portray ourselves as too fully rational and cool-headed. The fact that some elements may appear to be potentially “out of control” can be beneficial to creating and reinforcing fears and doubts within the minds of an adversary’s decision makers. This essential sense of fear is the working force of deterrence. That the US may become irrational and vindictive if its vital interests are attacked should be part of the national persona we project to all adversaries.”
88. Choe Sang-Hun, “North Korea Offers U.S. Deal to Halt Nuclear Test,” New York Times, January 11, 2015, page A7, is accessible online and states:
Until now, the United States has dismissed North Korea’s routine demand for an end to its joint military exercises with South Korea. The North has called them a rehearsal for an invasion while the United States and South Korea have insisted that their annual war games are defensive in nature.
But the North’s latest proposal included a new incentive for Washington, offering to temporarily suspend nuclear tests in return for a suspension of the joint military exercises this year.
89. “Department of Defense Operations During the Cuban Crisis” is accessible online and states: “To mask widespread preparations for the actions proposed, Admiral Dennison suggested that we announce that our forces were preparing for an exercise. PHIBRIGLEX 62, a large-scale amphibious assault exercise, previously scheduled for the period October 15-20, provided a cover for our Caribbean preparations.”
While the “actions proposed” are not spelled out in that paragraph, elsewhere the document talks about “a blockade of Cuba,” “if necessary, the removal of the Castro regime to assure the permanent removal of these weapons,” and the possible need “to take the missile bases out of Cuba by ground action.”
90. Choe Sang-Hun, “North Korea Offers U.S. Deal to Halt Nuclear Test,” New York Times, January 11, 2015, page A7. Accessible online.
91. Malcolm Byrne, “The Secret CIA History of the Iran Coup, 1953,” November 29, 2000, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 28. Accessible online. Document V at the end of the article, “Mounting Pressure Against the Shah,” has most of the quoted material on page 37. The remainder is in Appendix B, also accessible at the end of the article, “London Draft of the TPAJAX as Cabled from Nicosia to Headquarters on 1 June 1953,” page 23, point (5).
92. Kennett Love, “Royalists Oust Mossadegh; Army Seizes Helm,” New York Times, August 20, 1953. Accessible online.
93. United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, V. Case No. 93-241-CR-Highsmith, Affidavit of Howard Teicher, January 31, 1995. Accessible online.
94. Joyce Battle, “Shaking Hands with Saddam Hussein: The U.S. Tilts toward Iraq, 1980-1984,” National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82, February 25, 2003. Accessible online. Search on “don’t ask” to find the relevant part.
95. Shane Harris and Matthew M. Aid, “Exclusive: CIA Files Prove America Helped Saddam as He Gassed Iran,” Foreign Policy, August 26, 2013. Accessible online.
96. A positive view of the agreement is expressed in Richard Nephew, “Based on breakout timelines, the world is better off with the Iran nuclear deal than without it,” Brookings Institution, July 17, 2015. Accessible online.
For a negative view, see Olli Heinonen, “Iran’s Nuclear Breakout Time: A Fact Sheet,” The Washington Institute, March 28, 2015. Accessible online.
97. John R. Bolton, “To Stop Iran’s Bomb, Bomb Iran,” New York Times, March 26, 2015, page A23. Accessible online.
98. Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy, Harper and Row, New York, 1965, page 705.
99. Fedor Burlatsky, Khrushchev and The First Russian Spring: The Era of Khrushchev Though The Eyes Of His Adviser, Scribners, New York, 1988, page 169.
100. Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) on Operation MONGOOSE, 4 October 1962. Accessible online.
101. United States Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, “Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report,” November 20, 1975, pages 71-73. Accessible online.
102. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense: Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba,” March 13, 1962. Accessible online.
103. Robert F. Kennedy statement recorded on presidential tapes, October 16, 1962. See page 452 of the transcript in Timothy Naftali and Philip Zelikow (Editors), The Presidential Recordings: John F. Kennedy: The Great Crises, Volume 2, Norton, New York, 2001.
104. TIME, September 21, 1962, page 21, second column.
105. Fedor Burlatsky, Khrushchev and The First Russian Spring: The Era of Khrushchev Though The Eyes Of His Adviser, Scribners, New York, 1988, page 171.
106. The National Security Archive, “Last Nuclear Weapons Left Cuba in December 1962,” December 11, 2013. Accessible online.
107. Svetlana V Savranskaya, “New Sources on the Role of Soviet Submarines in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 28, No.2, 2005, pp. 233-259. See especially pages 246-247. Accessible online.
108. Barton J. Bernstein, “Reconsidering the Perilous Cuban Missile Crisis 50 Years Later,” Arms Control Today, October 2, 2012. Accessible online.
109. Jerold L. Schecter, translator and editor, with Vyacheslav V. Luchkov, Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes, Little, Brown, Boston, 1990, pp. 176-177.
See also Barton J. Bernstein, “Reconsidering the Missile Crisis: Dealing with the Problems of the American Jupiters in Turkey” in James Nathan (Editor), The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisted, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1992, page 124, notes 179 and 180. These add the proviso (missing from Khrushchev’s memoirs) that the missiles should be fired preemptively if the US invaded Cuba and intended to occupy it. Bernstein notes that the second proviso has little effect since it’s hard to tell if an invasion will be followed by an occupation. And, since Castro was convinced that an American invasion was imminent, at least in his mind, he was arguing for preemptive use of the missiles. Thus Khrushchev’s memoirs, while leaving out the provisos, still appear to convey what Castro was thinking.
110. Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1993, pp. 136-137.
111. Given the urgency of ending the crisis, the agreement between Kennedy and Khrushchev was worked out hastily and subject to interpretation that caused the risk of nuclear war to continue well after the iconic “thirteen days” that are usually said to comprise the crisis. For example, when Castro refused to allow on-site inspections that Kennedy and Khrushchev had included in their agreement, the Soviets left tarps off the missiles as they were being transported from Cuba by ship so American reconnaissance planes could verify their removal. Even so, Kennedy questioned whether our non-invasion pledge still held, and American preparations for an invasion continued into November. See David G. Coleman, “The Missiles of November, December, January, February: The Problem of Acceptable Risk in the Cuban Missile Crisis Settlement,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 9, No. 3, Summer 2007, pp. 5-48. Accessible online with appropriate access.
112. Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh (Editors), The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, The New Press, New York, 1998, page 392, first column.
113. Jim Hershberg, “Anatomy of a Controversy: Anatoly Dobrynin’s Meeting With Robert F. Kennedy, 27 October 1962, The Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 5, Spring 1995. Accessible online. In it, Kennedy’s speechwriter and confidante Theodore Sorensen is quoted as saying:
Ambassador Dobrynin felt that Robert Kennedy’s book did not adequately express that the “deal” on the Turkish missiles was part of the resolution of the crisis. And here I have a confession to make to my colleagues on the American side, as well as to others who are present. I was the editor of Robert Kennedy’s book. It was, in fact, a diary of those thirteen days. And his diary was very explicit that this was part of the deal; but at that time it was still a secret even on the American side, except for the six of us who had been present at that meeting. So I took it upon myself to edit that out of his diaries, and that is why the Ambassador is somewhat justified in saying that the diaries are not as explicit as his conversation.
114. Rodric Braithwaite, “The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan Didn’t Sort Out the Country – Will Ours?”, History News Network, June 11, 2011. Accessible online.
115. Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, Penguin, New York, 2004, page 90.
116. Ronald Reagan, “Message on the Observance of Afghanistan Day,” March 21, 1983. Accessible online.
117. Steven R. Weisman, “Afghans Mix ‘Sovietization’ and Free Market,” New York Times, May 15, 1987, page A6. Accessible online.
118. Carol Grisanti, Robert Windrem, Jim Poplin and Janullah Zada, “Afghan warlord urges revolt against U.S., Karzai: Audiotape obtained by NBC News calls for death of American commander,” NBC News, May 31, 2006. Accessible online.
119. Joanna Paraszczuk, “Afghanistan’s Hekmatyar Announces Support For IS In Fight Against Taliban,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 7, 2015. Accessible online.
120. Christian F. Ostermann and Mircea Munteanu, “Towards an International History of the War in Afghanistan,” 1979-1980, The Wilson Center, July 12, 2011. Accessible online. The Brzezinski quote is in Volume 1 (clickable from that page) and can be found by searching on “reassure Pakistan” and going to its second occurrence.
121. Eliot A. Cohen, “War Without Pity, War Without End,” The Wall Street Journal, August 2, 2013. Accessible online. This is a book review of Sheila Miyoshi Jager, Brothers at War, Norton, New York, 2013. The review notes:
The story of American statesmanship in Korea isn’t particularly inspiring. It includes the decision, Ms. Jager writes, “to rely on incumbent Japanese officials to carry out the essential functions of governance” during the initial post-World War II occupation—to which ‘the Koreans reacted with outrage.”
122. Stephen Bosworth and Robert L. Gallucci, “Reasons to Talk to North Korea,” International New York Times, October 28, 2016. Accessible online. Bosworth was responsible for negotiations with North Korea during the first Obama administration, and Gallucci served the same role during Bill Clinton’s presidency.
123. “The Torah on One Foot.” Accessible online.
124. Charles Lane, “The Professor Who Lit the Spark,” Stanford (Stanford University’s Alumni magazine), Accessible online.
125. Sheldon M. Stern, The Week the World Stood Still: Inside the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 2005, p. 50. This covers both JFK’s “goddamn dangerous” comment and how we zealously hid from it.
126. John Kerry, “Remarks at Ploughshares Fund Gala,” October 28, 2013. Accessible online.
127. Hans M. Kristensen, “US Nuclear Stockpile Numbers Published Enroute To Hiroshima,” Federation of American Scientists, May 26, 2016. Accessible online.
See also the Department of Defense’s “Stockpile Numbers, End of Fiscal Years 1962-2015,” accessible online.
The latter document makes clear that the 2,300 weapons awaiting dismantlement are not included in the 4,571 weapons listed for 2015.
128. Timothy Naftali and Philip Zelikow (Editors), The Presidential Recordings: John F. Kennedy: The Great Crises, Volume 2, Norton, New York, 2001, page 441.
129. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010. Accessible online.
130. Michael Dobbs, “Haig Said Nixon Joked of Nuking Hill,” The Washington Post, May 27, 2004, page A29. Accessible online.
131. Tony Blair, A Journey: My Political Life, Knopf, New York, 2010, page 613.
132. Le Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses (BEA) pour la Sécurité de l’Aviation civile, “Accident on 25 July 2000 at La Patte d’Oie in Gonesse (95) to the Concorde registered F-BTSC operated by Air France: Report translation f-sc000725a.” Accessible online, but it is a large download (12.5 MB).
The most relevant material is on pages 93, 94, and 146, with page146 stating:
As of 25 July 2000, it appears that the rate of tyre deflation/destruction on Concorde was on average one occurrence per 1,500 cycles (or 4,000 flying hours). This rate fell over time and the proportion was no more than one occurrence per 3,000 cycles (or 8,000 flying hours) between 1995 and 2000. By way of comparison, on long-haul aircraft, such as the Airbus A340, this rate is of the order of one occurrence per 100,000 cycles.
On average, the Concorde therefore experienced tire failures 100,000/1,500 = 6,700% more frequently than other long-haul aircraft. Our claim that “more than 10% of those tire failures resulted in fuel leaks” comes from page 93’s saying: “there are fifty-seven cases of tyre bursts/deflations … Twelve of these events had structural consequences on the wings and/or the tanks, of which six led to penetration of the tanks.”
133. This note provides the basis for my claim that, “For over a year before the minicrisis occurred, I had been warning that these Polish missiles bore a dangerous resemblance to the ones we placed in Turkey in the Spring of 1962.”
My paper, “Risk Analysis of Nuclear Deterrence,” appeared in the Spring 2008 issue of The Bent of Tau Beta Pi – the magazine of the Engineering Honor Society. On page 17, I state:
And, today, we are in the process of deploying a missile defense in Russia’s backyard (Poland and the Czech Republic) over strenuous Russian objections. A possible Russian response would be to threaten deployment of a similar missile defense in Cuba, much as our Jupiter missile deployment in Turkey was the stimulus for Khrushchev deploying his Cuban missiles.
This paper reached readers in March 2008, four months before the July 2008 Cuban Bomber Minicrisis and is accessible online. While not publicly accessible, an earlier October 2007 draft in my possession (and possibly the editor’s as well) shows that my concern predated the minicrisis by at least nine months. Extending from “at least nine months” to “over a year” depends on my memory and therefore is not as certain, I remember warning of the danger that 2008’s Polish missiles might have a similar effect as 1962’s Turkish missiles for months before that.
134. Vladimir Putin, “Press Statement and Answers to Questions following the 20th Russia-European Union Summit, Marfa, Portugal,” October 26, 2007. Accessible online.
On being asked “if Russia is ready to respond positively to President Bush’s latest initiative for cooperation in missile defense in Europe?” Putin replies: “I recall how things went in a similar situation in the mid 1960s. Similar actions by the Soviet Union, when it put rockets in Cuba, precipitated the Cuban Missile Crisis. For us the technological aspects of the situation are very similar.”
135. Peter Finn, “Russian Bombers Could Be Deployed to Cuba,” The Washington Post, July 22, 2008, page A10. Accessible online.
136. Alex Rodriguez, “Are Russians deploying a hoax?”, Chicago Tribune, July 26, 2008. Accessible onlilne. This contains both General Schwartz’s “red line” statement and the Russian Foreign Minstry’s denial of the original report.
137. Andrew E. Kramer, “Russia Calls New U.S. Missile Defense System a ‘Direct Threat’,” New York Times, May 13, 2016, page A6. Accessible online.
138. Mark Landler and Helene Cooper, “U.S. Fortifying Europe’s East to Deter Putin,” New York Times, February 2, 1016, page A6. Accessible online.
139. Bill Moyers, The Bill Moyers Journal, November 20, 2009. The transcript, which is accessible online, has the two Lyndon Johnson quotes.
140. John Barry, “Appeasing Russia: The historical reasons why the West should intervene in Georgia,” Newsweek, August 11, 2008. Accessible online in slightly modified form. In particular, the subtitle of the printed version, “The historical reasons why the West should intervene in Georgia,” is not present in the online version.
141. Heidi Tagliavini, “Lessons of the Georgia Conflict,” International Herald Tribune, October 1, 2009. Accessible online.
142. Karen Robes Meeks, “Listen to Hillary Clinton compare Russian President Vladimir Putin to Hitler,” LA Daily News, March 5, 2014. Accessible online.
143. Paul Kennedy, “A Time to Appease,” The National Interest, No. 108, July-August 2010, pp. 7-17. Accessible online.
144. Jack Lewis, “The Birth of the EPA,” EPA Journal, November 1985. Accessible online.
146. US Environmental Protection Agency, “Ozone Layer Depletion,” March 9, 2016, states: “the ozone layer is healing and should fully recover by about 2065.” Accessible online.
147. California Energy Commission, “In-State Electric Generation by Fuel Type,” May 6, 2016. Accessible online.
148. California Energy Commission, “Total Electricity System Power,” September 10, 2015. Accessible online.
149. The New START Treaty, which reduced both American and Russian nuclear weapons was ratified, but only after a key Senator, who had been undecided, changed his position and supported the Treaty. Phone calls by roughly 600 concerned constituents appear to have played a major role in making that happen. Here’s what happened:
The Treaty had been signed by President Obama in April 2010, but ran into opposition in the Senate, which had to ratify it before it came into force. Even though there had been extensive Senate debate by the Fall of 2010, some of the Senators opposed to the Treaty argued that a vote should be delayed until 2011, when some new Senators would have been elected and seated. Proponents argued that this was purely a political move, there had been adequate debate, and there should be an up or down vote so each Senator could state where he or she stood.
Delaying the vote might well have caused ratification to fail since that requires a two-thirds approval and the Republicans, who tended on average to oppose the Treaty, were expected to gain seats in the election. In fact, they ended up gaining six seats, their largest increase in sixteen years.
To bring New START to a vote, it first had to be voted out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where it was bottled up in September 2010. Senator Johnny Isakson (R-GA) was a key vote and on the fence. A concerted effort by several NGOs got approximately 600 constituents to call his office during the three days prior to the committee vote. Isakson got off the fence and voted to bring the Treaty to a floor vote, though without saying how he would vote on the floor. In December, when that floor vote took place, the same kind of effort was mounted again, and Isakson did vote for the Treaty. While 600 phone calls in three days make a major impression on a senator, 600 people are only 0.006% of Georgia’s population.
I am personally aware of this process because I supported it financially. I am not a citizen of Georgia, so I could not participate directly.
150. A picture I took of our Girl Scout group at the top of Red Peak Pass in 1972 is accessible online, but does not convey the full majesty of the vista. Dorothie is visible in our photo, left of center, wearing a blue, flowered hat, unfortunately hiding most of her face. A photo taken by another hiking party at a different time (with them in the picture) shows the vista and is accessible online.